Beyond Pakistan's borders, cries of a different sort echoed in India:

#BringBackAbhinandan

#StandByAbhinandan

"Thoughts and prayers with Wing Commander Abhinandan."

"We want our hero back."

These were the pleas that rang out amidst the constant shelling of #IndiaStrikesBack and #PakistanStrikesBack that had broken out on social media as netizens of the two neighbouring countries turned Facebook and Twitter into a warzone. The very people who had been consumed by bloodlust were now, under the guise of crusaders in a righteous war, demanding the return of one of their fallen.

Earlier this year, on February 14^th, as the world celebrated the day of love, a tragic incident unfolded as over 40 Indian paramilitary troopers were martyred in a suicide bombing at Pulwama in India's conflict-ridden state, Jammu and Kashmir. Social media and newsrooms alike erupted into bloodthirsty cries for war, yet again with Pakistan drowning out any voice of reason. On February 26^th, a jubilant BJP government announced the success of a surgical air strike carried out by the Indian Airforce (IAF) over Balakot, Pakistan, where they suspected the terrorist group responsible for the bombing, Jaish-e-Mohammed, was camped. While the two governments were engaged in a war of intelligence with Pakistan's government denying India's claims, yet another dogfight was unravelling in Pakistani airspace. On Feb 27^th, India was dealt another blow as Pakistani F16 jets shot down two MiG-21's of the IAF, and captured one of the pilots, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman. The man who had been hailed a hero by the Indian government now faced the fate of a prisoner of war.

This was one of many mishaps the IAF has faced in the past few months alone. As per records of aircraft losses enlisted on Bharat Rakshak, an online database that collects statistics on the IAF, there have been 9 aircraft accidents between 28^th January and 31^st March 2019. There have been 114 aircraft accidents with a high human cost between 2010 and 2018. Most of these accidents have been attributed to the MiG-21 jet also dubbed as the "flying coffin" by Indian media. It is the same aircraft that Wg.Cdr. Abhinandan Varthaman was flying during the dogfight, which belongs to an obsolete fleet of supersonic fighter jets imported from the Soviet Union with a decommissioning that is long overdue. Not just the IAF, but the Indian Army and Navy too are besieged by the shortage and the obsolescence of their machinery and equipment. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India's report in 2015 revealed the dearth of ammunition in the army and proclaimed India unequipped to last even a short 10-day war.

If India is so unprepared for war, one wonders why they risk an escalation of conflict with Pakistan who is rapidly closing the gap between the two countries in terms of conventional military prowess. In spite of the current Indian government's grand proclamations of modernizing the armed forces, the standoff with Pakistan has reopened the debate on why India's military modernization has yet to pick up the pace. Although a serious lack of funds, a tedious procurement procedure and an incompetent indigenous defence industry have been predominantly to blame, a closer look traces these factors to what appears to be a more systemically ingrained issue – the lack of coordination among the constituents of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) itself. Attempts at developing the military body have been ineffective so far because the emphasis has been laid more on treating the symptoms than the root cause itself.

Rahul Bedi's article in IHS Markit's reputed military journal, Jane's, holds the Ministry of Defence accountable for "delays in confirming tenders, alleged wrongdoing in acquisitions, frequently changing procurement priorities" and the services for their "ambiguity...in formulating their qualitative requirements (QRs) for equipment." The article also calls out the government-run Defence Research and Development Organisation and the other public sector units for their inefficiency in designing and manufacturing competent weapon systems. In relation to this, a naval veteran and defence analyst, C. Uday Bhaskar explains what he calls an "anomaly" that the Indian military faces. India has proven itself adept in the indigenous production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and SSBNs such as the INS Arihant, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, with more on the way. However, on moving down the spectrum to smaller-scale conventional capabilities, he categorizes India's overall productivity as being "below the global median". In attributing these shortcomings to the time and cost overruns incurred due to an impractical Defence Procurement Procedure and "modest allocation of funds" for modernization, his views align with others' both within and outside the armed forces community.

With the recent revival of the One Rank One Pension protests by ex-servicemen and a defence budget that barely grosses 1.5% GDP, the armed forces struggle to cover revenue costs that majorly include the payment of pensions and salaries. The additional burden of taxes to be paid as per the new Goods and Services Tax laws introduced by the government leaves a negligible pool of funds for capital expenditure which pertains to asset acquisition like ships, tanks and aircraft. Thus, the inter-service rivalry sparked as a result to gain the largest share of resources and acquire control over assets comes as no surprise. Uday Bhaskar, in one of his many analytical reviews, also revealed that the long-winded process of acquisition exacerbated the situation of defence spending by preventing the timely usage of the allocated funds. These events are evidence of the disruptive functioning of the government-defence machinery, a phenomenon that Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta anchor in the history of Indian civil-military relations. Their policy brief links estranged civil-military relations to Nehruvian policies of "strategic restraint" and ensuring the "subordination of the military to civilian authority".

Ex-military personnel and defence analysts concur that the parties involved – political, bureaucratic and military – are equally at fault. Senior officers have iterated "the 'casual approach' of the Indian government to augmenting military capability have progressively eroded' operational competence", Bedi reported in his article for Jane's. Commander (retired) Ranjan Bhattacharya identifies factors such as weakened military leadership and the lack of political commitment as key concerns regarding the lack of coordination between the government and the armed forces. Another ex-serviceman, shares a similar view, owing to the slackening of the modernization process to a "lack of political will".

As theorized in a 2016 study by S. Kalyanaraman, a member of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, the tension between civilian and military leaders arises from their different perspectives on ensuring national security and peace, with civilian authority focused on the "social imperative" while the military focuses on the "security imperative". The matter of political negligence can be ascribed to the limited domain expertise that civilian politicians and bureaucrats situated in the MoD possess. In the history of India's defence ministry, never has the portfolio of Defence Minister been given to ex-military personnel. Unfamiliarity with the technical know-how of defence projects could be what withholds civilian authority from assertive decision-making and approving procurement proposals. The current Defence Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, was formerly the Minister for Commerce and aptly so, having been educationally and professionally affiliated with the field of economics which does not prepare one to keep up with the demands of the post of Defence Minister. Her predecessor, Arun Jaitley, the current Finance Minister was formerly a lawyer by profession and had no expertise in the domains of defence and security.

Bhaskar adds that "political apathy in the national ecosystem and higher defence management stems from politicians' indifference and inclination to opt for easier alternatives such as importing equipment". Drawing upon Cohen and Dasgupta's idea of civilian authority striving to maintain its supremacy, it is likely that the deep-seated mistrust in civil-military relations comes from political leaders' fear of a military coup as seen in the cases of Pakistan and Thailand. However, this desire to establish absolute control over the military has proven to be counterproductive. Those at the helm of the armed forces have quite often been dubbed as "toothless" bodies, with special emphasis on the Integrated Defence Staff, by the media and defence personnel alike. This committee was appointed by the government to oversee and prioritize the needs of the three services in an integrated manner but to no avail. Another noticeably hierarchical organisation developed by India's higher defence management places the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs comprising of senior cabinet ministers on top, then the Defence Planning Committee consisting of the cabinet secretary; the prime minister's special secretary; the secretaries of planning, defence, finance, external affairs; and the three service chiefs, and the Chief of Staff Committee (CSC) representing the three services at the bottom. "This arrangement has often obfuscated the need for clear goals of policy implementation, frequently producing discord and tensions in Indian civil-military relations", political analyst, Ayesha Ray, surmised in her article titled 'Indian Civil-Military Relations'.

Frequent spats between the government and the service chiefs are yet again collateral of the imbalanced power dynamics between civil and military authorities. "Ideally, politics and the military should be kept separate. But in India's case, politicization of the armed forces has created a situation where sheep lead sheep. Military careers are often politically supported and favours need to be repaid", explicates Commander Bhattacharya as he goes on to emphasise the need for a smart government and military leaders with the gumption to stand up for what's right. In the past couple of decades, India has witnessed several distinguished, high ranking officers assume the offices of the respective service chiefs. While most concluded their careers uneventfully, some have made rather controversial exits. One such Chief of Naval Staff's (CNS) dismissal had caused quite an outrage and is exemplary of the dissatisfaction of defence personnel with the intrusive political and bureaucratic interference in military affairs. In 1999, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat was dismissed from his post for expressing his disapproval of the BJP government's choice of candidate for the post of deputy CNS. Although an unfortunate turn of events, it is not uncommon in the realm of military policies practised by other major powers of the world. The euphemistic discharge of Admiral William Fallon from the post of head of Central Command in the U.S. is a case rather similar to the Indian CNS' case. In 2009, Fallon was forced to resign due to his being opposed to waging war with Iran which was at odds with the US administration's foreign policy. Such incidents reflect the government's desperate attempts to shut out opposing views and surrounding itself with pacifists who are content to hold on to their power, thus, simplifying the task of establishing control over the military apparatus.

After 60 hours of being held captive in Pakistani territory, Wg.Cdr. Abhinandan Varthaman crossed the border a free man once again, ready to serve his nation. The MiG-21 class aircraft that he once performed feats of daredevilry in however had neared its retirement age. This would reduce the already downsized squadrons of the IAF even further from 33 strong to 22 squadrons as of 2035. It serves as a cautionary tale to the Indian government and defence establishment that they need to implement serious reforms to make headway in the modernization race. The few reformations that were initiated such as revising the DPP were futile as it led to more complications in the procurement system. The Times of India's senior defence correspondent, Rajat Pandit, reiterated the need for the reformation of the hierarchical organisation of the civil-military establishment. One of the widely accepted solutions has been the long-overdue appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff to replace the nominal body Integrated Defence Staff, which shall ensure better coordination among the services. Pandit claims "the integration of the 17 different Commands – 7 under the army, 7 under the IAF and 3 under the navy – into Theater Commands like the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman and Nicobar Command, would improve the armed forces' economic and logistic situation immensely." Last of all, the formulation of a clear National Security Strategy is necessary to inhibit the haphazardness of the course of modernization.

However, only time will tell if these initiatives will fructify given that the tussle for power among the services and between the services and the government will subside and they reconcile of their own volition.